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Abstract 
In 2018 India and Bhutan completed 50 years of their 
diplomatic relationships. For a large number of South 
Asian observers and commentators, the two countries are 
considered close to each other, however, there are areas of 
concern. One of them is India‟s investments in Bhutan‟s 
hydropower sector. There is a growing disillusionment 
among a section of the Bhutanese population over India‟s 
engagements in this sector. This paper looks at the 
relationships between the two countries and examines the 
concerns of Bhutanese against India. The author argues 
that Bhutan is a small but strategically important country 
for India whose concerns must be satisfactorily addressed 
by New Delhi.   
Keywords: China, Doklam, Friendship Treaty, Hydropower, Royal 
Monetary Authority 
1. Introduction 
As a small neighbouring country, Bhutan does not attract 
significant attention in India. This statement can be substantiated 
by looking at the number of articles and commentaries on Bhutan 
published in the journals, newspapers and websites run from India. 
The situation is such even though after assuming the office in 2014, 
the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi paid his first bilateral 
foreign visit to Bhutan. During his visit, he inaugurated India 
funded Supreme Court building in the country and held bilateral 
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dialogue with the King and the prime minister of the country. Since 
then there has been several bilateral visits of the political leaders to 
each other‟s countries. In recent years only time the country 
received due attention from Indian media and, a few of the Indian 
strategist thinkers was during the Doklam/Doko-La or Donglang 
crisis in 2017 when India and China engaged in a military stand-off 
for 73 days in a territory in Bhutan.  
Politically, India and Bhutan share very close relationships. 
However, over the years, differences have emerged between the 
two countries on certain issues. One of them is India‟s investments 
in Bhutan‟s hydropower sector. A section of Bhutanese accuses 
India for exploitation of their hydro electricity for its own benefit 
and pushing the country into hydro debt trap. This paper looks at 
the bilateral relationships between India and Bhutan and examines 
some of the concerns of Bhutanese against India. Besides the 
introduction and conclusion, this paper is divided into three parts. 
The first part discusses the history of India-Bhutan relationships.  
The second part looks at the political development after Doklam 
military stand-off. The final section examines India‟s investment in 
Bhutan‟s hydropower sector which has disillusioned a section of 
Bhutanese. Some of the views expressed in this paper and contents 
have been earlier published in form of commentaries (See Ranjan, 
2018a, Ranjan, 2018b and Ranjan & Ravindran, 2018).  
2. History of India-Bhutan Relations 
India-Bhutan relationships dates to ancient times. For the 
Bhutanese, India is gyagar (the holy land) because Buddhism which 
is being practised by almost all of them was born in India. In eighth 
century AD, an Indian monk named Padmasambhava arrived in 
Bhutan to teach tenets of Buddhism. He was from Uddiyyana 
(present-day in Swat valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan) 
and was regarded as the third Buddha in the Vajrayana tradition 
(Stobdan, 2017). In Bhutan, he is popularly known as Guru 
Rinpoche. It is believed that through his spiritual powers, 
Padmasambhava had subdued all hostile spirits and divinities from 
Tibet who posed threats to the Himalayan kingdom (Karma, 2013, 
p. 89). 
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In the medieval period especially after Bengal came under the 
control of the Mughals (1526-1857) in 1576, confrontations between 
the local Mughal governors and the Bhutanese administrators to 
control the fertile plains of Bengal was a regular affair. After 
consolidation of Aurangzeb‟s reign (1658-1707) over India, Mughal 
commander, Mir Jumla was sent to capture Cooch Behar and 
punish King Pran Narayan. To protect himself, the King fled to 
Bhutan. Pran Naryan‟s asylum in Bhutan led to Bhutanese 
involvement in the affairs of Cooch Behar in following years (Ibid). 
After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 the Mughal power weakened. 
This helped the Bhutanese to solidify further their supremacy over 
Cooch Behar. In 1750s, Bhutan appointed a de-facto viceroy and 
garrisoned forces in Cooch Behar. In 1765, once again the 
Bhutanese interfered in Cooch Behar‟s affairs to prevent a possible 
coup in the state (Karthikeyan, 2017). 
In 1764 after the victory in Battle of Buxar the East India Company 
formally occupied Bengal and Bihar. During the Company‟s rule in 
India, there were frequent skirmishes between the Bhutanese and 
the East Indian Company‟s army over duars (fertile land in rivers 
Brahmaputra and Ganga region in Assam and Bengal). To engage 
with Bhutan, in the 1770s and 1780s a number of missions were 
sent to Bhutan by Governor-General Warren Hastings (Robinson, 
1989). However, peace could not be made. Later, the two sides 
fought a war in 1773 in which the East India Company‟s troops 
defeated the Bhutanese army. Afterwards, the two sides signed a 
treaty of peace and commerce in 1774 (Kohli, 1993). But peace was 
established only after the signing of the Treaty of Sinchula between 
Bhutan and British India in November 1865. Under this treaty, 
Bhutan ceded a part of Assam and Bengal duars and about eighty-
three square kilometres of territory in south eastern Bhutan to 
British India. This was in return of an annual subsidy of 50,000 
rupees. 
In 1910, notably, to counter the China‟s charges in Bhutanese 
territory, the treaty of Punakha was signed between Bhutan and 
British India.  Under this treaty, the British agreed to not interfere 
in the internal affairs of Bhutan to which the Bhutanese agreed „to 
be guided by the advice of India in regard to its foreign relations‟ 
(Robinson, 1989, p. 164). The treaty of Punakha was not a stand-
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alone document but a modification of the treaty of Sinchula which 
the two sides signed in 1865. Since then, although the term 
„protectorate‟ has never been used by the British to describe their 
relationship with Bhutan, the country was almost treated as such.  
After independence from the British rule in 1947, India emerged as 
its successor state. To keep Bhutan on its side, India signed the 
treaty of Friendship with Bhutan in 1949. In 1968, diplomatic 
relationship between India and Bhutan was established with an 
appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimphu. Prior 
to it, a political officer in charge of Sikkim1 also oversaw India‟s 
Bhutan relations (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of 
India, 2012).  In the late 1960s, 70s and 80s there were moments 
when it seemed that Bhutan was all set to drift from India. For 
example, in 1968, Bhutan barred unauthorized foreigners, 
including Indians, from entering its territory.  A year later in 1969, 
Bhutan also started its own currency (Shubham, 2014). In 1970, 
after setting up its ministry for foreign affairs, Bhutan tried to have 
an independent foreign policy. In 1978, the Bhutan Mission in India 
was renamed as the Royal Bhutanese Embassy. This was seen by 
India as a diversion from the spirit and letters of the 1949 treaty 
(Ibid). In 1984 Bhutan began boundary related talks with China.  It 
also reduced India‟s annual assistance to Bhutan by 43 per cent and 
started looking for other international donors (Ibid).   
After a short period of political anxiety, India-Bhutan relations 
were put on tracks in late 1980s. In 1988 then President of India, R. 
Venkatraman paid a visit to Bhutan. Before him in 1985 and again 
in 1988, then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi visited Bhutan 
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2012). In the 
1990s, India aided infrastructure projects in Bhutan. For example, 
in 1995, work on Kurichhu hydro project began with 60 percent 
grant and 40 percent loan by India to Bhutan. Then in 1997 works 
on the Tala Project began with 60 percent grant and 40 percent loan 
by India (Economic and Political Relations between Bhutan and 
Neighbouring Countries, 2013) 
In 2007, the India-Bhutan friendship treaty was updated. Article 2 
of the 1949 treaty states that “The Government of India undertakes 
to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. 
On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the 
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advice of the Government of India in regard to its external 
relations” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
2007).  Under Article 6 of the 1949 treaty, Bhutan had to obtain 
permission from India over matters of arms import. 2007 updates 
have relieved Bhutan from both. Article 2 of the 2007 updated 
treaty states that “neither Government shall allow the use of its 
territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest 
of the other” (Ibid).  On security front, Article 4 of the treaty states 
that “The Government of India agrees that the Government of 
Bhutan shall be free to import, from or through India into Bhutan, 
whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores 
as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of 
Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as 
long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of 
the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger 
to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan agrees 
that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition and 
materials outside Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by 
private individuals” (Ibid). Then Article 3 and 8 of the treaty calls 
on for having free trade and commerce, and consolidation of 
economic relationships between the two countries (Ibid).  
Earlier to address India‟s concern, in 2003 the Royal Bhutan Army 
carried out Operation All Clear to flush out the United Liberation 
Front of Assam and Bodo militants taking shelter in Bhutan (The 
Bhutanese, 2015). Unfortunately, most of the Indian media 
incorrectly showed that the operation was carried out by the Indian 
security forces (Ibid). After the update of the India-Bhutan 
friendship treaty, then Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh 
visited Bhutan in 2008. At that time India agreed to let Bhutan have 
16 entry and exit points to facilitate trade and commerce with other 
countries except China. In 2014, soon after taking the office, Modi 
paid visit to Bhutan. In 2016 India and Bhutan signed an agreement 
on Trade, Commerce and Transit between the two countries.   
3. Post-Doklam Developments in India-Bhutan Relations 
There is a growing shadow of China on India-Bhutan relationships. 
Historically, in 1971 Bhutan voted in favour of the People‟ Republic 
of China‟s membership to the United Nations.2 In 1979, China and 
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Bhutan decided to have a direct negotiations on their border issues 
(Mathou, 2004). The first round of boundary talks was held in 
Beijing in April 1984. From 1994, Chinese ambassadors to India 
have been paying working visits to Bhutan. Since 1995, Bhutan has 
been “supporting (the) one-China policy” (Ibid). In 1998 Bhutan 
and China signed an agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and 
Tranquility Along the Sino-Bhutanese Border Areas. The two sides 
accepted that they have reached an agreement and agreed to work 
in accordance with the five principles of mutual respect for each 
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs and 
peaceful co-existence and for the purpose of maintaining peace and 
tranquillity along the Sino-Bhutanese border. In 2015, the 23rd 
round of talks was held in Thimphu and, in 2016, technical expert 
groups from the two countries met in Bhutan (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Government of Bhutan, 2016). 
Despite agreement and on-going talks on border, in 2017 a military 
stand-off took place between India and China when China laid a 
territorial claim over Doklam in Bhutan. Doklam is a plateau of 
approximately 89 square kilometres, which lies at the tri-junction of 
India, China and Bhutan. It is close to India‟s „Chicken‟s Neck‟, the 
Siliguri Corridor. The stand-off remained for about 73 days, 
following which India and China agreed to disengage their 
personnel from that site on 28 August 2017 (Ministry of External 
Affairs, Government of India, 2017).  
Earlier, on 29 June 2017, in a press release, the Bhutanese 
government stated: 
Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and 
China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 
1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain 
peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending 
a final settlement on the boundary question, and to 
maintain status quo on the boundary as before 
March 1959. The agreements also state that the two 
sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or 
use of force, to change the status quo of the 
boundary. Bhutan has conveyed to the Chinese side, 
both on the ground and through the diplomatic 
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channel, that the construction of the road inside 
Bhutanese territory is a direct violation of the 
agreements and affects the process of demarcating 
the boundary between our two countries. Bhutan 
hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be 
maintained as before 16 June 2017. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Royal Government of Bhutan, 2017) 
Soon after the military disengagements at Doklam, India decided to 
open Bhutanese consulate at Guwahati in 2018. In another 
significant development after the Doklam military stand-off, 
Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Kong Xuanyou, visited Bhutan 
from 22 to 24 July 2018. He was accompanied by Luo Zhaohui, the 
Chinese Ambassador to India. In Bhutan, the Assistant Foreign 
Minister met the fifth king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the 
fourth king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, and Tobgay (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China, 2018).  During 
the meetings, the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister stated, that  
the Chinese side is willing to work with the 
Bhutanese side to maintain high-level contacts, 
expand practical cooperation, and strengthen 
multilateral communication and coordination, so as 
to achieve common development on the basis of 
mutual respect, mutual benefit and win-win results. 
The Chinese side welcomes Bhutan to actively 
participate in the Belt and Road Initiative and share 
China‟s development dividend. Both sides should 
continue to promote the boundary negotiations, 
abide by the already-reached principles and 
consensus, and jointly maintain peace and 
tranquillity in boarder areas so as to create positive 
conditions for the final settlement of the boundary 
issue (Ibid).  
On its part, the Bhutanese side expressed that 
although China and Bhutan have not formally 
established diplomatic relations, the two countries 
have enjoyed a traditional friendship which could be 
regarded as a model between big countries and 
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small countries. The Bhutanese side admires the 
development achievements of China and welcomes 
the positive outcomes of the Belt and Road Initiative 
proposed by President Xi Jinping…Bhutan firmly 
adheres to the one-China policy and is committed to 
deepening exchanges and cooperation with China 
and stands ready to maintain communication with 
the Chinese side on bilateral relations and the 
boundary issue (Ibid).  
About the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister‟s visit to Bhutan, 
Thimpu kept New Delhi “in the loop” (Roy, 2018). However, India 
remains cautious about any such visits and meetings between the 
officials from Bhutan and China.  
Later, on 15 September 2018, Bhutan had its primary round of polls 
to choose the next government. The incumbent party failed to 
qualify for the final round of polls which were held on 18 October 
2018. In the elections, the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) party 
won the elections and its leader Lotay Tshering became the new 
prime minister of Bhutan. After becoming prime minister, Tshering 
paid a visit to India from 27 to 29 December 2018.  During his visit 
the two prime ministers“expressed satisfaction at the excellent state 
of bilateral ties of friendship and cooperation, which are marked by 
utmost trust, mutual understanding, goodwill, respect for each 
other‟s interests, and reinforced by robust people to people 
linkages and close economic and development partnership” 
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2018). The two 
sides discussed the Government of India‟s development assistance 
package for Bhutan‟s 12th Five Year Plan for the period 1 
November 2018 to 31 October 2023. It was conveyed to Bhutan that 
India will provide grant assistance of Indian Rupees (INR) 4500 
Crore towards Bhutan‟s 12th Five Year Plan, and a transitional 
Trade Support Facility of INR 400 Crore over a period of five years 
to strengthen bilateral trade and economic linkages (Ibid). The two 
countries reiterated their commitment to jointly develop 10,000 
Mega Watt (MW) of hydropower generating capacity in Bhutan. In 
this regard, the leaders discussed the Sankosh Hydropower Project. 
They expressed satisfaction at the progress of the 720 MW 
Mangdechhu hydro-power project in Bhutan (Ibid). The leaders 
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welcomed the mutually beneficial understanding reached between 
the two sides on the tariff for the export of surplus power from 
Mangdechhu project in Bhutan to India (Ibid). 
 4. Areas of Concern 
Despite historical relationships the two countries share, there are 
areas of concern which have disillusioned a section of the 
population against India. This is clearly visible in India‟s 
hydropower investments in Bhutan. India‟s assistance to Bhutan 
started in 1961. Later in 2006, the two countries signed a 
comprehensive agreement in the hydropower sector. An additional 
protocol to the 2006 agreement was signed in March 2009. Under 
the additional protocol, India agreed to assist Bhutan in developing 
a minimum of 10,000MW of hydropower by 2020. India also agreed 
to import surplus amount of electricity from those hydro projects 
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2018). Earlier, 
the projected capacity was 5,000 megawatts. This estimate was 
doubled after the visit by then-Indian Prime Minister, Dr 
Manmohan Singh, to Thimphu in 2008. The objective behind the 
agreement was to make Bhutan a self-sufficient country in electric 
generation and to help the country reduce its trade deficit with 
India (Tala Hydroelectric Project, 2018). 
The format of the 2006 hydropower agreement is similar to the 
1,020 MW Tala hydropower project agreement between the two 
countries. The Tala hydroelectric project is the largest functional 
hydropower project in Bhutan. Work on this project began in 1998 
and it was commissioned in 2008. India‟s assistance for Tala came 
in the form of 60 per cent grant and 40 per cent loan, with an 
interest rate of nine per cent per annum (Ibid). Indian companies 
Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited of India, Hindustan Construction 
Company, Larsen and Tubro and Jaiprakash Industries 
participated in the Tala contract (Lamsang, 2017). 
Bhutanese complain that India buys cheap electricity from the 
hydroelectric projects in Bhutan. For example, in 2017, the tariff 
rate on the import of hydroelectricity from the Tala hydroelectric 
project by India was 1.80 Bhutanese Ngultrum (BTN). This was 
much below the domestic market price in India which was around 
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₹7 to ₹8 per unit (Ibid). In July 2017, Bhutan proposed a tariff hike 
from the Chukha hydropower project. The last hike was made in 
2014 when the tariff rate was raised from BTN 2 per unit to BTN 
2.25per unit. Bhutan‟s  proposal to raise the tariff was accepted, in 
principle, by India (Outlook, 2017).  
Almost all hydropower projects take more than the needed time to 
start operation. Such delays add debt burden to Bhutan because the 
loan granted by India to Bhutan keeps on charging 10 per cent3 
every year (Tala Hydroelectric Project, 2018). Dasho Karma Ura, 
President of the Centre for Bhutan Studies and Gross National 
Happiness Research, stated, “It is important that hydropower, 
which is [a] key issue for the Bhutanese people also be looked at 
more quickly…public opinion in Bhutan was beginning to question 
the viability of the debt incurred by the projects” (Ibid). 
In 2016, New Delhi-based Vasudha Foundation published “A 
Study of the India-Bhutan Energy Cooperation Agreements and the 
Implementation of Hydropower Projects in Bhutan”. According to 
the report, the first major challenge faced by the Bhutanese is 
hydropower project-related debts. In the Financial Years 2016-17, 
the country had “₹118.77 billion of outstanding Indian Rupees 
loans. Of the total Rupee debt, 94.11 per cent were outstanding 
public debt on hydropower projects while 5.89 percent represented 
debt taken to finance BOP [Balance of Payments] transactions with 
India (the Government of India line of credit)” (Royal Monetary 
Authority of Bhutan, Government of Bhutan). It is being 
maintained that the three ongoing projects – Mangedchhuand 
Punatsangchhu I and II would put Bhutan under about ₹12,300 
crore rupees of debt. This accounts for 77 per cent of the country‟s 
total debt and is about 87 per cent of its GDP (Haider, 2017). 
There is also a concern over the emergence of an auxiliary Indian 
economy in Bhutan. The massive influence of Indian hydropower 
companies and their participation in the accompanying sectors are 
being questioned by the Bhutanese. For example, Larsen & Toubro, 
Gammon India and Hindustan Construction Companies have also 
set up stone crushing industries, besides their contract in the 
Punatsangchhu hydropower project (Bisht, 2012). 
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The hydropower sector was supposed to provide jobs to the local 
population, however, according to the Vasudha Foundation report, 
they have not. According to a release by the Indian Embassy in 
Bhutan in 2015, “There are about 60,000 Indian nationals living in 
Bhutan, employed mostly in the hydro-electric power and 
construction industry. In addition, between 8,000 and 10,000 daily 
workers enter and exit Bhutan every day in [the] border towns” 
(Vasudha Foundation, 2016). The rate of unemployment in Bhutan 
was 2.1 per cent in 2013 and 2.9 in 2014 (Ibid). At many project sites 
and after the start of their operations, some of the locals allege that 
they have not been provided with the necessary training to take up 
jobs in the sector(Ibid). On the contrary, the Royal Monetary 
Authority Report of 2016-17 says that the hydropower sector has 
contributed to generating direct and indirect employment 
opportunities for the Bhutanese. The report states, “As of June 
2017, there are 3,950 (851 are key officials and staff) employees in 
PHP I (Punatsangchu Project -I), 6,942 (857 key officials and staff) 
in PHP II (Punatsangchu Project -II), and 4,857 (509 key officials 
and staff) in MHP (Mangdechhu Project). There are about 1,687 
employees under DGPC (Druk Green Power Corporation), mainly 
for operation and maintenance of generating hydro plants, and 
about 2,500 under Bhutan Power Corporation for the construction 
and maintenance of electricity transmission line in Bhutan”(Royal 
Monetary Authority of Bhutan, Government of Bhutan „Annual 
Report 2016-17‟,  50). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has looked at the history of relationships between India 
and Bhutan which exists since ancient times. In past, there were 
certain hiccups but the relations never deteriorated.  At present, 
although the two states share cordial relations, there are certain 
areas of concerns. One of them, as discussed in this paper, is India‟s 
investments and engagements in Bhutan‟s hydropower sector. 
Reduction in grant‟s ratio by India to Bhutan and inordinate rise of 
hydropower debts have made many Bhutanese a bit wary about 
such projects. There is a prevailing undercurrent among a section 
of Bhutanese that India exploits their hydropower resources for its 
own benefits (See Lamsang, 2019).  
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In South Asia, almost all neighbouring countries have been 
attracted towards China because of its economic might, capability 
to make huge investments and grant loans. India is trying to make 
similar offers to its neighbours, though less in quantity. As India 
cannot not match China in terms of money, it must accommodate 
the interests and address the concerns of neighboring countries.  
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Endnotes  
                                                          
1  Sikkim became a part of India in May 1975. 
2  From 1945 to 1971 it was Republic of China which was member of the 
United Nations.  
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3 At some places it is mentioned that the rate is 9 per cent. See „Tala 
Hydroelectric Project‟. op cit. 
 
